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THE PROBLEM OF COURT ENFORCED MORALITY
INTRODUCTION
On July 17, 1996, TWA Flight 800 exploded shortly after take off,
killing all 230 people on board.' Sixteen of those passengers were high-
school students from Montoursville, a small town in rural Pennsylvania.2
After some of the pain and mourning subsided, the parents who were left
behind began debating what should be done to prevent a similar tragedy
from befalling others. Some parents wanted revenge; others wanted to
make someone pay for killing their children. Once the parents decided
that litigation was the best course of action, they quickly learned how
painful the process would be. Each family would have to litigate its case
separately. Since Boeing had admitted liability, the only issue at trial
would be damages. Each family would have to prove, in dollars and
cents, the worth of their child. In the words of the attorney for many of
the families, "[t]he only thing on trial will be your loved ones."4
Boeing initially made identical offers to all sixteen families, which
were summarily refused. In an attempt to avoid protracted litigation, the
parties headed for mediation. After hearing from two of the parents,
Boeing's attorneys came back with another offer, this one rumored to be
in the neighborhood of $2.5 million per child. Bob and Irenay Weaver,
who had been chosen to represent the parents at the mediation, decided it
was enough. In the end, Boeing and the families agreed to a confidential
settlement, but the families discovered a hard truth: the settlement did not
provide accountability, nor would a trial. Steve Uzupis, one of the fa-
thers, summed up the feelings of the families when he said:
This is your child, and in the back of your mind, there's this feeling
that you're standing up for her, that you're trying to make some
meaning out of her death. To make something positive occur so it
does not happen ever again. And the settlement means that the fight
is over, and you know that the end result is not going to change any-
thing. It's a horrible feeling. It's like, "Jeez, there should have been
more to it than just this."
5
The recent criminal trial of professional basketball star Kobe Bryant
is just one of many examples of a criminal case that never went to a full
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trial before a judge and jury.6 Bryant was accused of raping a 19-year-
old woman in a hotel near Vail, Colorado.7 Unlike many criminal cases,
which never go to trial because of plea bargains, Bryant's case was dis-
missed because the accuser no longer wanted to proceed. 8 The alleged
victim has remained silent; however, her lawyers' statements have led
many to conclude that she could no longer handle the public scrutiny of a
trial.9 The Bryant case was unusual in another respect: the alleged victim
received a public apology.' 0
These high-profile cases are representative of the fact that few legal
disputes ever reach full-blown trial. These two examples highlight some
of the reasons that many of today's legal scholars are concerned with the
state of the trial court system in the United States.
In The Myth of Moral Justice: Why Our Legal System Fails to Do
What's Right, Fordham Law School professor Thane Rosenbaum criti-
cizes many aspects of the legal system in the United States.1'
Rosenbaum's book comments on the manner in which trial courts oper-
ate, 12 the ethics and professional responsibility of attorneys, 13 plea bar-
gains,14 and civil settlements. 15 In his own words, Rosenbaum's central
argument is that "moral consideration and private conscience should be
integrated into legal decision-making."' 16 Combining recent high-profile
cases with popular books and movies, Rosenbaum argues that the public
expectation of law and justice differs significantly from the reality of law
and justice. 17 Rosenbaum's work is a continuation of decades of growing
criticism of the American legal system.
This book review focuses on two major areas in which Rosenbaum
criticizes the current legal system. Part I examines Rosenbaum's criti-
cisms of the trial court system. Part II examines Rosenbaum's criticisms
of attorney conduct and his proposed changes to legal ethics and profes-
sional responsibility. Each part also suggests that Rosenbaum's ideas,
while perhaps good in theory, are impractical and shortsighted.
6. Bryant Apologized To Accuser As Criminal Case Is Dropped, WALL STREET JOURNAL,




10. Id. Although Bryant issued a public apology, it was given under the condition that it
could not be used against him in any subsequent civil action. The apology was also worded in such
a way that denied any real responsibility on the part of Bryant: "Although I truly believe this
encounter between us was consensual, I recognize now that she did not and does not view this
incident the same way I did." Id.
11. THANE ROSENBAUM, THE MYTH OF MORAL JUSTICE: WHY OUR LEGAL SYSTEM FAILS TO
Do WHAT'S RIGHT (2004).
12. Id. at 103-13.
13. Id. at 114-38.
14. Id. at 100-03.
15. Id. at 93- 100.
16. Id. at 231.
17. Id. at 16-17.
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I. THE LEGAL SYSTEM
The overarching theme of The Myth of Moral Justice is that anyone
who feels wronged should be allowed his or her day in court, in front of a
judge and a jury.' 8 In other words, "the story itself is and provides its
own remedy."' 9 While this theme is the underlying premise for all of
Rosenbaum's criticisms, it is most dominating throughout his criticism of
the trial court system.
A. Rosenbaum's Criticism of the Current Legal System
Through critical analysis of several aspects of the trial court system
and examples of how he believes the system should function,
Rosenbaum lays out his paradigm of moral justice. Although
Rosenbaum's vision of moral justice may seem simple, it would provide
trials much different than those provided by the current system. Parties
and witnesses would provide an unfettered and uninterrupted recounting
of the facts in a public forum. 20 Settlements and plea bargains would be
eliminated and replaced with open public trials.
21
1. Storytelling as Remedy
Rosenbaum suggests that courts should be a place for not only the
discovery of the truth but also the healing of injuries. 22 Public trials are
the only way to discover the truth.23 One of the questions asked by
Rosenbaum is:
[W]hether, instead of limiting their role to presiding over zero-sum
contests, courts can entertain broader conversations about moral out-
comes that don't rely exclusively on crowning winners. Is it possible
for courts to infuse and align their legal decisions with an apprecia-
tion of the moral universe? And, in doing so, can judges and lawyers
find ways to humanize the law so that it does not coldly ignore the
pain that resides within and around the creases of human conflict?
2 4
In Rosenbaum's system of moral justice, the telling of the story
would govern the process. Even "[i]f nothing else gets accomplished, if
criminals go free and tortfeasors succeed in causing further negligence,
the telling of the story, by itself, is still the morally correct outcome. ,
25
After the story telling is through, if the court grants a legal remedy,
18. Id. at 58-59.
19. Id. at 58.
20. See id. at 58-59.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 22.
23. Id. at 90.
24. Id. at 22.
25. Id. at 58-59.
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Rosenbaum feels that the remedy "must also offer moral and spiritual
relief, and be directed to both body and soul.
2 6
2. Courts Should Consider Morality
Describing the current legal paradigm as the "Legal-Body-
Punishment/Money" system, Rosenbaum contends that this current para-
digm focuses almost exclusively on finding the "legally correct" out-
come and is only concerned with damages to property or physical inju-
ries to the human body.27 Rosenbaum proposes an alternative paradigm:
"Moral-Soul-Acknowledgement/Restoration." 28 Under his new sys-
tem, courts would work toward "moral outcomes," and the human spirit
would be protected from "spiritual violence, indignity, and neglect. 29
The moral outcomes that Rosenbaum would have courts provide include
acknowledgement of any harm done by the defendant followed by an
apology. 30 The final step in Rosenbaum's system of moral justice would
be the restoration of the damaged relationship between the parties.3'
Rosenbaum provides only a vague notion of where the structure of
his morality should come from. 32 He repeatedly refers to a nexus be-
tween law and religion,33 but he does not believe morality must necessar-
ily be connected with religion:
[l]n an age where we are naturally suspicious of moral absolutes, and
where moral relativism reigns supreme, some people are made un-
comfortable by any notion that there is a universally shared standard
of morality, or that there even is such a thing as doing the right thing.
But what's right and what's moral doesn't have to conform to a par-
ticular religious ethos. In our fear of religious intolerance, we
shouldn't ignore that morality and conscience can and should guide
private lives.
34
3. Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence Get in the Way
Rosenbaum suggests that the rules of civil procedure and the rules
of evidence are two of the biggest enemies of story telling, placing these
rules and procedures at "the very core of what passes for immoral justice
in America." 35 Rosenbaum believes that the rules of civil procedure and
26. Id. at 34.
27. Id. at 30-31.
28. Id. at 33.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 34-35.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 14-15.
33. Id. at 12-15.
34. Id. at 14.
35. Id. at 93.
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the rules of evidence "mercilessly trump[]" moral justice, and says that
"without them, moral justice has a fighting chance." 36
In Rosenbaum's system of moral justice, litigants would tell their
stories uninterrupted and unrestrained by rules of procedure or evi-
dence. 37 He envisions courthouses as "public grieving grounds., 38 The
"true path to moral justice," he says, would be "a legal system that is as
much interested in grieving, healing, and restoration as it is in compensa-
tion and punishment. 39 Parties and witnesses would dictate the flow of
the trial rather than judges. Rosenbaum accuses judges and lawyers of
not understanding "how little the lay person cares about the evolution of
rules and precedents, and how much he simply wants to tell his story."
40
This argument stems from Rosenbaum's idea of "what it means to do
justice":4'
Giving people an opportunity to speak about what happened to them,
and to confront those who are responsible for their hurt, is an indis-
pensable part of what it means to do justice, and to administer a legal
system that is just .... A court of law.., should function as a sanc-
tuary for truth-telling, with remedies limited not just to law, but to
personal healing, as well.
42
Specifically, Rosenbaum would change or eliminate the rules of
evidence that limit the introduction of a defendant's prior bad acts.43
Rosenbaum also would alter the rules of procedure that mandate dis-
missal of a case when the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted,an as well as those that bar the filing of a case due to the
statute of limitations.45 Under Rosenbaum's paradigm, plaintiffs would
be given time in front of a judge and jury even if their claim was not a
violation of law or was not pled in the proper manner. 46 In addition,
36. Id. at 93. But see FD. R. EviD. 102 ('These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and devel-
opment of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly
determined.") (emphasis added).
37. ROSENBAUM, supra note 11, at 108-09.
38. Id. at 70.
39. Id. at 71.
40. Id. at 58.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 58-59.
43. Id. at 112. "[A]side from the possible prejudice, isn't this exactly the kind of full disclo-
sure that the jury should hear in deciding guilt and innocence? .. . [What] we have now is truth-
seeking with many of the truths in permanent lockup." Id. "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith." FED. R. EvtD. 404(b).
44. Id. at 116. Rosenbaum specifically attacks Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
which states in part that "the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion
... (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted ......
FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(6).
45. ROSENBAUM, supra note 11, at 133.
46. Id. at 116-17.
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plaintiffs would be allowed to bring a claim no matter how much time
had passed since the alleged injury.47
Rosenbaum goes so far as to place the blame for immoral outcomes
on the constitutional rights that many hold sacred, including the pre-
sumption of innocence, the right to have illegally obtained evidence ex-
cluded from trial, and the rights to due process and equal protection un-
der the law.48
4. Settlements do not Fulfill Parties' Wishes
Rosenbaum argues that out-of-court settlement of civil litigation
does not fulfill the wishes of the parties.49 He questions the morality of
settlements, alleging that "in most situations they merely serve to silence
the story in return for a cashier's check." 50 In seeming contradiction of
his later criticism of the win-at-all-costs adversary system,51 Rosenbaum
suggests that the system should not assume that litigants are better off
reaching a compromise in settlement.52 In addition to describing civil
settlements as "entirely lawful, economically efficient bribe[s], ' 3
Rosenbaum argues that settlements strip the legal system of "its thera-
peutic, healing potential. 54 Calling settlements "spiritually unsatisfy-
ing,",55 he views the courtroom trial as a public catharsis that brings com-
munities together in "the search for the truth and the moral lessons that
are learned from those truths. 56 He seems to believe that one of the
problems of settlement is the lack of emotional outbursts and histrionics
that frequently occur during trial.57  Rosenbaum feels that settlements
belittle the claims brought by the plaintiff, "pretend[ing] that the story
was never important enough to tell. 58 In sum, Rosenbaum claims set-
tlements are immoral and unjust because they deprive people of the
chance to tell their stories, they involve no truth-finding, they do not al-
low for outside or public scrutiny of the parties involved, and they pro-
duce little or no public record of the proceedings.5 9
5. Plea Bargains Inhibit the Search for the Truth
Along with settlements in the civil arena, Rosenbaum also attacks
plea bargains as being immoral because they "undermine truth and sub-
47. Id. at 134.
48. Id. atI 17.
49. Id. at 93.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 130.
52. Id. at 94.
53. Id. at 96.
54. Id. at 94.
55. Id. at 99.
56. Id. at 94.
57. Id. at 95.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 94.
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vert justice., 60 He is critical of what he sees as a lack of truth in a system
where criminal defendants end up jailed for crimes that they did not
commit, but plead guilty to anyway, all in the name of judicial effi-
ciency. 6' "Truth," he says, "becomes hostage to the efficiencies gained
from negotiated pleas." 62 Rosenbaum proposes that the morally correct
solution would be for the legal system to rely less on plea bargains and
more on trials, with prosecutors representing the interests of both the
state and the victims.
63
Cognizant of the public desire for justice and punishment,
Rosenbaum questions whether people would ever accept a system of
criminal justice where historical and restorative justice would be seen as
equals to retributive justice. 64 In the end, he concedes that "moral and
historical justice, no matter how laudable, would lose much of its moral
authority if guilty criminals went unpunished. 65
Rosenbaum is not alone in his criticism of plea bargains. What is
unique about Rosenbaum's criticism, however, is his focus on the harm
caused to the alleged victim by the plea bargain; many of Rosenbaum's
premises assume the guilt of the defendant.66 His criticisms of criminal
plea bargains, similar to his criticism of civil settlements, focus almost
exclusively on the perceived injustice done to the alleged victim without
ever really addressing any injustice done to the defendant or alleged per-
petrator.67
Most other critics have instead focused on the violation of the de-
68fendant's constitutional rights. Timothy Lynch has said that "[p]lea
bargaining rests on the constitutional fiction that our government does
not retaliate against individuals who wish to exercise their right to
trial.",69 Lynch presents evidence that the sentences handed out to defen-
dants who lose at trial are frequently as much as five times as long as
what had been offered in a plea bargain.70
60. Id. at 100.
61. Id. at 87.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 102-03.
64. Id. at 102. Rosenbaum describes historical justice as "knowing the truth of what hap-
pened," and restorative justice as a system that seeks to "heal wounds and enable some reconciliation
to occur." Id.
65. Id. Rosenbaum qualifies this concession by claiming that under the current system there
are many defendants who end up incarcerated because they accepted a plea bargain instead of risk-
ing stricter punishment at trial. Id.
66. Id. at 89. Rosenbaum distorts the right to confront one's accuser into the victim's right
"to confront those who have harmed them." Id.
67. See id. at 85-90.
68, Timothy Lynch, The Case Against Plea Bargaining, REGULATION, Fall 2003, at 26;
WHITNEY NORTH SEYMOUR, JR., WHY JUSTICE FAILS 88 (1973).
69. Lynch, supra note 68, at 26.
70. Id.
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Other critics of plea bargaining have equated the practice to de facto
sentencing. 71 Defendants who cannot afford bail often sit in jail for sev-
eral weeks or months, only to be released after agreeing to a plea of
guilty and a sentence of time served. Many have argued that this is the
equivalent of a conviction and a sentence without a trial.72
B. Why Rosenbaum's Ideas Will Not Work
There are numerous reasons why Rosenbaum's proposed changes
will not work. Moreover, many legal scholars have commented on the
benefits provided by settlements and plea bargains, two of the tools that
Rosenbaum would severally restrict or even eliminate.
1. Giving Everyone His or Her Day in Court is Inefficient
Rosenbaum's system is impractical. A situation where everyone
who is wronged would have his or her day in front of a judge and jury is
not possible in today's clogged court system. 73 Providing more access to
justice is a noble goal, but simply expanding the court system will not
achieve this goal.74 Bringing more disputes to trial would mean more
hours spent by attorneys in court. While this might give clients more
attention from their attorneys, it would also force attorneys to take fewer
cases. Even if it may be possible to create more courtrooms, hire more
judges and support staff, and train more attorneys, the increased eco-
nomic costs of doing so would result in a legal system that even fewer
people could afford.
2. There is No Place for Morality in the Courtroom
Among those who disagree with Rosenbaum is United States Su-
preme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, who has said that "[g]overnment is
not meant to save souls but to protect life and property and serve the
common good. Its responsibility is the here, not the hereafter." 75 Justice
Scalia feels that while morality may have a place in the making of laws,
it has no place in the judicial system when those laws are interpreted.76
Others have gone further, comparing the imposition of morality on the
courts as "nothing more than the will of the majority at the moment.
77
Rosenbaum's suggestion that morality be imposed on the justice
system has an even greater opponent than Justice Scalia: growing public
71. SEYMOUR, supra note 68, at 88.
72. Id.
73. See ROSENBAUM, supra note 11, at 89 (admitting that trials are rare because courthouses
are overburdened with too much litigation and criminal prosecution).
74. See id. at 89-90 (proposing the building of more courthouses and appointment of more
judges).
75. Dale Kueter, Scalia Lectures at Cornell-Justice, morality and the law, GAZETrE ONLINE,





resistance to the incorporation of religion into government. One of the
more famous examples of this conflict is the recent high-profile incident
involving Roy Moore, the former Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme
Court.78 Moore was removed from the bench in 2003 for his refusal to
remove a two-and-a-half ton monument of the Ten Commandments from
the rotunda of the Alabama Supreme Court.7 9 Moore defended his re-
fusal to remove the monument as an expression of the right to "acknowl-
edge God as the moral foundation of our law.",80 The monument was
eventually removed after a protracted legal battle that was initiated by
several groups, including the American Civil Liberties Union and
Americans United for Separation of Church and State; both organizations
claimed the monument was an unlawful promotion of religion in a public
place.81
3. Civil Procedure and Evidence Protect Litigants and Promote
Truth-Seeking
Despite Rosenbaum's assertions to the contrary, 82 the rules of civil
procedure and the rules of evidence have not been promulgated to create
an excuse for courts to not hear a case. 83 The rules of evidence have
been created not only to ensure that a trial proceeds in an orderly and
predictable manner, but also to define the roles of all participants.84 A
further purpose of these rules is to exclude evidence that, while relevant,
may be overly prejudicial, mislead the jury, confuse the legal issues, or
waste time.
85
Many of the rules of civil procedure have been implemented to dic-
tate the flow of trials in an efficient manner, as well as to protect each
party from frivolous or time-wasting maneuvers by an opposing party.
Statutes of limitations have been upheld on the basis that it is contrary to
the notion of justice to fail to put one's opponent on notice that he will
need to defend himself within a reasonable amount of time and that "the
right to be free from stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right
to prosecute them.",86 These time limitations allow plaintiffs a reasonable
amount of time in which to bring a claim, while at the same time protect-
78. Manuel Roig-Franzia, Alabama Judge Is Removed; Moore Installed Monument to Com-
mandments, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2003, at AO1.
79. Id.
80. Janita Poe & Bill Rankin, Commandments Feud Spurs Arrests; Supreme Court Stays Out
of Dispute in Alabama, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Aug. 21, 2003, at lB.
81. Id.
82. See ROSENBAUM, supra note 11, at 133 ("When the legal system can find an excuse not to
hear a case-to have it excluded or dismissed-it will do so rather than undertake the more moral,
truth-seeking path where full, uninhibited, uninterrupted stories can be heard.").
83. See, e.g, STEVEN I. FRIEDLAND, PAUL BERGMAN, & ANDREW E. TASLITZ, EVIDENCE
LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.03 (2000).
84. Id.
85. Id. at40 [§ 4.03].
86. Ry. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944).
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ing defendants, as well as the courts, from having to determine the truth
of something that happened years before.
87
Another way that the rules of civil procedure protect the litigants is
by requiring that a complaint meet a standard of legal sufficiency.8 8 Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the dismissal of a
complaint when the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. 89 Despite Rosenbaum's charges that this rule leads to
what many view as an immoral and absurd outcome,90 Rule 12(b)(6)
protects the defendants and the court from wasting time when there is no
relief or remedy that the court can provide to the plaintiff.91
4. Settlements Can in Fact Fulfill the Wishes of Parties
Although Rosenbaum is not the only commentator opposed to set-
92tlement of civil litigation, there are some who support settlement.
Geoffrey P. Miller notes that litigation "seems to stir up animosity and
hatred in a particularly unpalatable way'93 and sees settlement as a way
to avoid these side effects of litigation. Miller acknowledges that settle-
ment and litigation "accomplish the same result," however, he argues
that because settlement is the less expensive alternative, social resources
94are put to better use.
In reviewing the many criticisms of settlement, Miller notes a com-
mon theme that is very similar to Rosenbaum's argument: "trials are, or
should be, more 'just' or 'fair' than the private resolution of disputes."
95
Miller notes the parties involved in litigation have a better understanding
of the facts, and that judges cannot always be depended upon to act in
accordance with the law.96 He says there is no evidence to support "[t]he
proposition that judges are better able than individual litigants to deter-
87. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (citing United States v. Marion, 404
U.S. 307, 322, n.14 (1971)) (explaining that over time, evidence is lost, witnesses die or disappear,
and memories fade, thus impairing the ability to ascertain the truth).
88. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., COLIN C. TAIT, & WILLIAM A. FLETCHER, PLEADING AND
PROCEDURE 645 (8th ed. 1999).
89. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) ("A complaint should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.").
90. ROSENBAUM, supra note 11, at 116-17.
91. JOSEPH W. GLANNON, CIVIL PROCEDURE-EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS 314 (4th ed.
2001).
92. See generally Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (arguing that the
party with fewer resources is often forced, due to financial constraints, to accept a less favorable
settlement than what they could have obtained at trial); Jules Coleman & Charles Silver, Justice in
Settlements, SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y. 103 (Autumn 1986) (arguing that settlements inhibit substantive
justice by replacing the judgment of a court with an agreement by the parties).
93. Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement of Litigation: A Critical Retrospective, in REFORMING THE
CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 21 (Larry Kramer ed., 1996).
94. Id. at 13.




mine the 'just' result."97 Miller concludes that if dispute-resolution
mechanisms other than litigation are available at little or no cost, then
those mechanisms should be made available to litigants so that they may
reach voluntary private settlements.98
5. Plea Bargains are a Viable Alternative
Plea bargains are widely accepted and commonplace in the criminal
justice system. Only about ten percent of all criminal cases ever go to
trial.99 Most of the cases that do not go to trial are resolved by the defen-
dant pleading guilty. 10° Plea bargains have received approval from the
United States Supreme Court' l ' and are considered by their supporters as
an effective method for reducing not only court dockets, but also over-
crowded prisons.'0 2 Plea bargains are viewed by many as a way to use
the courts' and the prosecutors' limited resources on prosecuting crimes
that have the most egregious effects on society, such as murders, rapes,
and drug-trafficking, while allowing efficient disposition of less serious
crimes such as petty theft. 0 3 Miller has suggested that the use of plea
bargains may actually increase deterrence by allowing prosecutors to
utilize their limited resources in a more effective manner. [04
In addition to economic efficiency, the Supreme Court has asserted
that plea bargains provide justice through their expediency. '5 As op-
posed to a full trial, the Court noted that a plea bargain provides a quick,
and in most cases, final resolution to many criminal cases. 0 6 The Court
further noted that a plea bargain "avoids much of the corrosive impact of
enforced idleness during pre-trial confinement for those who are denied
release pending trial ... and, by shortening the time between charge and
disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of
the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned."' '
11. THE CONDUCT OF ATTORNEYS
Embedded throughout Rosenbaum's attacks on the legal system is
the underlying notion that those who control the system, particularly
attorneys, are the source of all that is wrong with the system.
Rosenbaum would create a more morally correct system by reforming
the current understanding of ethics and professional responsibility.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 25.
99. Lynch, supra note 68, at 24.
100. Id.
101. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1977).
102. ARTHUR ROSET" AND DONALD R. CRESSEY, JUSTICE BY CONSENT 34-35 (1976).
103. Id. at 35.
104. Miller, supra note 93, at 25.
105. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971).
106. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261.
107. Id.
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A. Rosenbaum 's Criticism of Attorney Conduct
Rosenbaum saves perhaps his harshest criticism of the legal system
for attorneys. Rosenbaum attacks two pillars of the practice of law: the
concepts of zealous advocacy and attorney-client privilege.
1. Zealotry as Bloodsport
Rosenbaum likens courthouses to "legally sanctioned fight clubs"
that encourage "immoral, emotionally destructive contests that bring
about little relief and tremendous suffering."' 0 8 Although his comparison
of the legal system to the "coliseums of Ancient Rome" or the "rings of
the World Wrestling Federation ' ' 09 may seem extreme, he is not the first
to compare the practice of law to bloodsport. In other commentary, law-
yers have been compared with gladiators, and their tactics likened to
weapons. 10
Rosenbaum blames zealous advocacy for the lack of civility in the
courtroom. 1 ' He makes this argument by defining zealotry and then
imputing his definition to the legal system through a clever twisting of
words. Although zealotry may have many connotations, the common
definition of zealotry is fairly neutral." 12 Rosenbaum's definition of zeal-
otry, however, is not so neutral. Rosenbaum says that zealotry "is the
highest fulfillment of evil" and "is for people who are out of control in
their beliefs, completely locked into their own truths, and out of touch
with the rest of the planet.""13 Rosenbaum uses his definition of zeal-
otry to criticize the concept of zealous advocacy set out in the ABA
Model Rules." 4 "Zealotry," Rosenbaum says, "has a way of trampling
over any respect for the truth. So much of what passes for zealous advo-
cacy in the law is all about fudging, spinning, and explaining away the
unflattering elements of a client's story. And in the worst cases, the law-
yer engages in outright lying."
'" 5
2. The Attorney-Client Privilege Encourages Lying
Rosenbaum also criticizes the attorney-client privilege. He disputes
the notion that lawyers are better able to defend a client due to privilege,
because without it, the client may withhold information that could be
108. ROSENBAUM, supra note 11, at 50.
109. Id.
110. Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for the Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv.
1031, 1039 (1975).
111. See ROSENBAUM, supra note 11, at 129-30.
112. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1455 (11th ed. 2003). Zealotry is
defined as "excess of zeal; fanatical devotion." Id. Zeal is defined as "eagerness and ardent interest
in pursuit of something." Id.
113. ROSENBAUM, supra note 11, at 129.
114. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 2 (2003). "As advocate, a lawyer zealously
asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system." Id.
115. ROSENBAUM, supra note 11, at 130.
[Vol. 82:2
COURT ENFORCED MORALITY
critical to an effective defense.' 6 Rosenbaum argues that when conver-
sations between attorneys and their clients remain privileged, there can
be no moral justice:
The safeguarding of secrets ultimately compromises truths ....
Moral justice becomes impossible to achieve when attorneys fail to
reveal what they know when it is morally wrong not to. The attor-
ney-client privilege serves the interest of clients who wish to speak
frankly with their attorneys, but it also has the social and moral con-
sequence of perpetuating secrets and lies.'
There has been some support for modifying the rules regarding the
attorney-client privilege. Marvin Frankel has proposed that truth should
be made "a paramount objective" and that there should be an affirmative
duty upon everyone involved to work towards the achievement of that
objective. 1 8 Frankel further notes that while the litigation attorney has
often relished the role of "hired gun," lawyers should consider that "'sell-
ing' our stories rather than striving for the truth cannot always seem,
because it is not, such noble work as befits the practitioner of a learned
profession."" 9 He proposes that the rules of professional responsibility
for attorneys should not only require the disclosure of material facts but
also should "forbid material omissions rather than merely proscribe posi-
tive frauds.' 120 As a way to implement such changes, he submits a draft
for new disciplinary rule based on SEC's Rule lOb-5.12 He concludes
that the ethical and moral standards that have been created for businesses
can also be applied to the legal profession.
122
B. Why Rosenbaum 's Arguments Fall Short
Rosenbaum's criticisms of professional responsibility are based on
anecdotal evidence, pop cultural, and his own personal experience. Sev-
eral legal scholars, as well as the American Bar Association, have taken a
different view.
1. Zealotry is Neutral
Although some attorneys may be guilty of the behavior Rosenbaum
describes, his argument is fallacious because it fails to include much of
what the ABA Model Rules have to say about zealous advocacy. The
Model Rules acknowledge that lawyers face many difficult decisions in
116. Id. at 126.
117. Id. at 122.
118. Frankel, supra note 110, at 1052.
119. Id. at 1055.
120. Id. at 1057.
121. Id. at 1057-58. SEC Rule lOb-5 states in part: "It shall be unlawful for any person ...
[tlo make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order
to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading ... " See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974).
122. Frankel, supra note 110, at 1058.
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the practice of law. 123 Yet the Rules do not call for, and in fact outright
prohibit, much of the conduct that Rosenbaum ascribes to zealous advo-
cacy:
Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a
lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the law-
yer's own interest in remaining an ethical person while earning a
satisfactory living .... Within the framework of these Rules, how-
ever, many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise. Such
issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional
and moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the
Rules. These principles include the lawyer's obligation zealously to
protect and pursue a client's legitimate interests, within the bounds of
the law, while maintaining a professional, courteous and civil atti-
tude toward all persons involved in the legal system.'
24
Rosenbaum's proposals raise a very interesting contradiction. He is
opposed to the Rules of Evidence interfering with the story-telling that
he feels is necessary to any trial, but he is also opposed to lawyers adding
any "spin" to a client's story or attempting to explain away "unflattering
elements," one of the very things that the Rule of Evidence attempt to
limit. 25 His ideal justice system, it seems, would be one in which all
parties tell the truth in as neutral a way as possible. While this is a noble
ideal, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to fully achieve. Many parties
and witnesses are going to tell their stories in a light that is most favor-
able to achieving their desired result. One important point that
Rosenbaum appears to miss is that usually the reason that a law suit is
filed in the first place is because someone is not telling the truth or is
refusing to take responsibility for his or her own actions.
2. The Attorney-Client Privilege Puts Clients in Control
Another commentator takes a critical look at the role-differentiated
behavior of lawyers and when it might be justified. 26 Richard Wasser-
strom agrees that such behavior is proper in the criminal defense con-
text.' 27 He concludes, however, that even if such behavior is justified in
other situations, we still pay a social price.
12 8
Wasserstrom says there is a specific role of the lawyer at trial.
12 9
Trial, he says, is a "well-established institutional mechanism" for resolv-
123. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 9 (2003).
124. Id. (emphasis added).
125. ROSENBAUM, supra note 11, at 130.
126. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 3
(Fall 1975) (describing "role-differentiated behavior" as the ability "for the person in a particular
role to put to one side considerations of various sorts-and especially various moral considera-
tions-that would otherwise be relevant if not decisive").





ing disputes.130 "Each side is represented by a lawyer whose job it is both
to present his or her client's case in the most attractive, forceful light and
to seek to expose the weaknesses and defects in the case of the oppo-
nent." 131 While Wasserstrom believes that this mechanism "helps to
guarantee that every criminal defendant will have his or her day in
court,' 32 he agrees with Rosenbaum's assessment that attorney-client
privilege in the civil context is unnecessary and "almost certainly exces-
sive."' 33 Wasserstrom submits that justice might be better served if law-
yers did not subscribe to the theory of role-differentiated behavior: "In
this sense it may be that we need a good deal less rather than more pro-
fessionalism in our society generally and among lawyers in particular."'
134
Wasserstrom offers the argument that "[i]f lawyers were to substi-
tute their own private views of what ought to be legally permissible and
impermissible for those of the legislature, this would constitute a surrep-
titious and undesirable shift from a democracy to an oligarchy of law-
yers. ' 4 35 He leaves unanswered the question of whether such behavior
by lawyers can be justified within the legal system but concludes that
society will pay a high price for such behavior.
136
While Rosenbaum addresses many areas of legal ethics that are
viewed negatively by the non-legal community, his proposals create
many questions that he leaves largely unanswered. Who is to decide
what is morally right and wrong? Should morality be codified similar to
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Should we have a legal
system in which it is up to each individual attorney to decide for himself
or herself what is morally right and what is morally wrong?
Rosenbaum criticizes the current system because there is "no duty
to disclose contemplated acts of spiritual violence, such as emotional
harm, or the causing of humiliation or indignity."'137 Many of these acts,
however, are not considered to be crimes or illegal activities. Under
Rosenbaum's system of moral justice, the attorney-client privilege seem-
ingly would be sacrificed not just to prevent future harm to other people,
but also to prevent another person's feelings from being hurt. Further-
more, the realm of what lawyers should or must disclose would become
even murkier as lawyers struggled to determine what actions by their
clients may lead to emotional harm or spiritual violence.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 10.
133. Id. at 12.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 10-11.
136. Id. at 11-12.
137. ROSENBAUM, supra note 11, at 123.
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Rosenbaum perhaps best sums up his ideal system of legal ethics by
referring to the popular television show The Practice:
1 38
Clearly the assistant district attorney on The Practice is right: there is
a great difference between legal ethics and private morality. When
legal ethics starts to resemble moral behavior, it will go a long way
toward restoring confidence in a legal system that unsparingly per-
petuates immoral justice under the guise of law. 1
39
III. CONCLUSION
In a system of moral justice as envisioned by Rosenbaum, each
family from Mountorsville would have paraded into court to tell the sto-
ries of the children they had lost and how much they meant to them.
Representatives and attorneys from TWA and Boeing would have been
required to spend weeks, if not months, listening to the tales of the griev-
ing parents. At the end of it all, however, the available remedies in
Rosenbaum's system would differ little from what the parents were given
under the current system: money and maybe an apology.
According to Rosenbaum, the best remedy for an alleged victim of a
crime is the opportunity to confront the accused in an open courtroom
and explain how much harm the actions of the defendant have caused.
140
His system would allow the alleged victim to speak without any restraint.
He is silent, however, with respect to the rights of the accused to do the
same. Under his system, Kobe Bryant's accuser would have sat on the
witness stand and told her version of the events unchecked by any rules
or procedural mechanisms. This appears to be exactly the opposite of
what the alleged victim actually wanted to do, especially when Bryant
and his attorneys attempted to exercise for themselves the very rights that
Rosenbaum would grant to his accuser.
In The Myth of Moral Justice, Rosenbaum suggests that the current
legal system should be changed to more closely comport with the general
public's notion of fairness and justice. Some of his changes may be fea-
sible, if not desirable. When taken as a whole, however, Rosenbaum's
ideas would render a system of justice that would provide less justice
than the one it would replace. Rosenbaum's system would drive up legal
fees and court costs while simultaneously increasing the time needed to
resolve disputes. Rosenbaum's system also would be extremely vulner-
able to shifts in public opinion. In sum, while Rosenbaum's ideas set a
138. Id. at 127-28.
139. Id. at 128-29.
140. Id. at 59 ("[T]hat's why the community is brought in as witnesses, to serve as jurors and
to listen not just to the proceedings, but, more important, to the pain .... The aggrieved have the
right to shout their pain out to the world, and the courthouse must be their megaphone.").
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noble standard for the way all people should interact, they are not en-
tirely suitable for a system of laws.
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